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Abstract
Over the past two decades, historians have 
begun using oral histories to reinterpret the 
history of World War II. Earlier historians 
have relied heavily on official documents, 
journalists’ accounts and the letters, diaries, 
and memoirs of commanders and staff 
officers, leaving out the experiences of 
the common soldier. Oral histories have 
provided more detailed, personal, and 
emotional accounts of WWII than the 
written records. My research combines the 
oral histories of the 32nd Infantry Division, 
the Red Arrow Division, with written 
sources in order to gain new perspectives 
and insight into the soldiers’ experiences in 
WWII during the New Guinea campaign.
The New Guinea Campaign: 
A New Perspective Through the Use 
of Oral Histories
As I was walking through the dense 
jungle, I hiked through the kunai 
grass; it was razor sharp grass that 
grew from two to twelve feet high. 
I was leading men on a mission to 
take a Japanese pillbox, and I saw a 
path that was cut through the kunai 
grass. I thought, “Why am I going 
through this tall grass? I’ll go where 
I can see,” so I went down the path. 
Then all of a sudden it dawned 
on me that this was a pre-cut fire 
lane and that a Japanese machine 
gun was training in on me from 
the other side. I instinctively dove 
for the other side and as I did they 
cut loose with their machine guns. 
A bullet hit me in my arm and leg 
and another ricocheted off the stock 
of my rifle that luckily lay across 
my chest. All I could think about 
was that I knew I was hit.1
This is an account from an oral history 
with Sergeant Robert Hartmen of the 
126th Infantry Regiment in the 32nd 
Infantry Division. He is recalling 
the Battle of Buna, which began in 
November of 1942 and was part of 
the New Guinea Campaign, one of the 
longest and most grueling campaigns 
fought by United States ground forces 
in World War II. It began on September 
20, 1942 and lasted until November 10, 
1944.2 New Guinea’s location off the 
northern coast of Australia and its status 
as the second largest island in the world 
made it an ideal location for Japanese 
attack, and the hard-won Allied victory 
there helped to make the final victory 
possible.3 Despite its importance, the 
New Guinea Campaign has become one 
of WWII’s forgotten episodes. The use 
1 Robert Hartmen, oral history, Michigan Military History Institute (MMHI).
2 The 32nd Division Veteran Association, 32nd Infantry Division, The Red Arrow in World War II, http: //www.32nd-division.org/history/ww2/32ww2.html.
3 Harry A. Gailey, MacArthur Strikes Back: Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), 9.
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of oral histories makes it possible to do 
justice to the New Guinea campaign and 
the efforts of the men who fought it. 
Over the past two decades, historians 
have begun to utilize oral histories to 
reinterpret the events of World War II. 
The Veterans History Project (VHP), 
established in 2000 by the Library of 
Congress (LOC), has expanded these 
efforts by promoting the collection 
and preservation of the memories 
of America’s wartime veterans. Oral 
histories provide personal details that 
are not found in written records. The 
oral histories of the 32nd Infantry 
Division, more commonly known as 
the Red Arrow Division, add a personal 
perspective to aspects of the campaign 
that have been typically ignored or 
overlooked in the existing written 
histories. These new details help to 
explain the course and outcome of the 
campaign. Above all, the oral histories 
shed light on the soldiers’ training, their 
incessant struggles with the difficult 
terrain, their relationships with the 
Australian allies, and their sufferings 
from tropical diseases. They not only 
add detail to existing accounts, but also 
correct distortions and outright errors 
in those accounts, making it possible to 
produce a more complete and accurate 
picture of the campaign.
The Red Arrow Division, which 
fought in World War I and World 
War II, originally began as a blended 
National Guard unit with men from 
Michigan and Wisconsin. The Division 
had three regiments that fought during 
the New Guinea Campaign: the 126th, 
127th, and 128th Infantry Regiments. 
According to an oral history with 
Sergeant Robert Hartmen of the 126th 
Infantry Regiment, the division had 
twelve companies in it from across 
Michigan, from Coldwater to Grand 
Rapids and Grand Haven to Ionia.4 The 
Red Arrow Division was reactivated in 
October 1940, and the men were sent to 
train at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. In 
February 1941, they were sent to Camp 
Livingston, Louisiana.5 The Red Arrow 
Division was one of the first National 
Guard units to be called up to active 
federal service. As a National Guard 
unit, they were not required to serve 
outside of the western hemisphere or 
for more than twelve months anywhere 
else. It took a congressional bill to relax 
the restrictions and extend the service 
dates of the Red Arrow Division. This 
bill was passed in August 1941, by a 
slim one-vote margin.6 After the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, the United States began 
preparations to send troops overseas 
to fight. The Red Arrow Division was 
shipped to Fort Devens, Massachusetts 
to prepare for an early departure to 
Northern Ireland, but shortly after 
arrival at Fort Devens, their orders 
changed. Instead, the Red Arrow 
Division was sent to California and on 
April 22, 1942, it set sail for Australia.7 
The division landed in Adelaide, South 
Australia and was transported halfway 
across the continent to Camp Cable in 
Brisbane for more training before it was 
ordered to New Guinea on September 
13, 1942.8 The Red Arrow Division 
ended World War II with a total of 654 
days in combat, which rivaled any other 
combat unit in America’s history.9
There are discrepancies between the 
written texts and Red Arrow veterans’ 
oral histories when examining whether 
the men had training, and how much of 
it they had. According to the majority of 
written histories, the men received little 
general training and no jungle warfare 
training before being sent to New 
Guinea. An official Army commentary 
stated,
It was largely an army of amateurs 
in which many officers were 
occupied chiefly in learning how to 
be officers, and the men were being 
trained with scant equipment, and 
without realization, on their part, 
of the dead seriousness of the task 
ahead.10
According to Harry Gailey, author 
of MacArthur Strikes Back Decision at 
Buna: New Guinea 1942-1943, the 32nd 
Division was unlucky to be selected to 
operate in New Guinea because none 
of their training prepared them for the 
environment.11 The official division 
history notes, “The 32d Division’s 
composition as it began its field training 
was basically the same as it had been 
during World War I.”12 
On the other hand, the oral histories 
from the Red Arrow veterans who 
served in the New Guinea Campaign 
reveal that the soldiers did receive jungle 
warfare training once they arrived in 
Australia and New Guinea. Red Arrow 
veteran Wellington Francis Homminga 
explains that the training was similar 
in both places, but the change in the 
terrain made a significant impact on 
their training. While in Brisbane, they 
were training at Sandy Creek, and they 
had general training with rifles, machine 
guns, grenades, terrain maneuvers, and 
jungle warfare. He explains that the jungle 
warfare training increased once they 
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4 Robert Hartmen.
5 Public Relations Office, 32nd Infantry Division, 13,000 Hours, 4.
6 Major General H. W. Blakeley, The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1957), 10-11.
7 Blakeley, 20.
8 Blakeley, 33.
9 Blakeley, inside cover.
10 Blakeley, 9. 
11 Gailey, 102.
12 Blakeley, 10.
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arrived in Brisbane, Australia. There they 
were sent out into the Blue Gum woods 
with a series of compass readings, and 
they had to find their way back. They 
used the compass to find a specific area or 
person that was designated as their goal. 
In his oral history, Homminga compares 
this training to the training the soldiers 
received immediately after arriving in 
New Guinea. He states, “You walked 
into the jungle and you immediately 
did not know where you were, the only 
thing you had to go by was the compass 
headings.”13 He says that in Australia the 
soldiers at least had some sense of where 
they were going, but in New Guinea they 
could wander around for hours in the 
jungle without knowing where they were. 
Homminga’s oral history reveals that the 
men did receive training that was related 
to jungle warfare and that they were 
trained on how to venture through the 
jungles of New Guinea. These insights, 
revealed through oral histories, at least 
partially contradict what the written 
histories, such as the official history, assert 
about the men’s training. 
The second issue that the text 
draws attention to is in the official 
written history of the 32nd Infantry 
Division where it examines General 
Eichelberger’s (Commander of the 
Eighth Army of which the 32nd was 
a part) controversial book, Our Jungle 
Road to Tokyo where he writes:
In Washington I had read General 
MacArthur’s estimates of his two 
infantry divisions, [32nd and 41st] 
and these reports and our own 
inspections had convinced my staff 
and me that the American troops were 
in no sense ready for jungle warfare. 
I told Generals MacArthur and 
Sutherland, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, 
that I thought the 32d Division was 
not sufficiently trained to meet the 
Japanese veterans on equal terms.14
According to an oral history with Red 
Arrow veteran Stephen Janicki, while 
the soldiers were not fully trained for 
jungle warfare, they were somewhat 
prepared for Japanese tactics because 
of the instructions they received from 
the Australians. While the soldiers were 
in Brisbane, Australian officers came 
to their camp and trained them on 
Japanese tactics and operations. Janicki 
recalls the Australian officers telling 
them to be on alert because the Japanese 
were cunning, ruthless, and that they 
were everywhere, including in the trees. 
The officers explained that the Japanese 
would tie themselves to trees, which 
meant that the soldiers had to watch 
both the ground and the jungle canopy 
in order to defend themselves from the 
cunning Japanese. Later in Janicki’s oral 
history, he refers to his training and 
recalls that they realized that what the 
Australians had told them was true, that 
the Japanese were in the trees, so they 
began to fire upon the trees while in 
combat.15 Janicki’s oral history adds new 
insight into the wartime experiences 
of the Red Arrow Division. While the 
written histories portray the troops 
as lacking and incapable because of 
insufficient training, the oral histories 
reveal that the training the men received 
helped them while they were involved 
in action. This shows that while the 
soldiers may have been undertrained, 
the limited jungle training that they did 
have was of value to them. 
There are two main examples seen 
in the descriptions of the jungle terrain 
that lack detail, oversimplify, and do 
not draw conclusions about how it 
affected the soldiers while in battle. 
First, written histories tend to generalize 
the hardships of the terrain, glossing 
over the effects it had on the soldiers’ 
fighting conditions. Authors like Samuel 
Milner in his book Victory in Papua, The 
War in the Pacific fail to recognize how 
the terrain affected the men. He writes, 
“The terrain, as varied as it is difficult, 
is a military nightmare. Towering saw-
toothed mountains, densely covered 
by mountain forest and rain forest…”16 
This statement draws attention to 
the problematic terrain, but it fails to 
recognize and make any connections 
to how it affected the soldiers who 
were fighting a war in the middle of 
it. Author Harry Gailey also uses such 
broad statements in his book, MacArthur 
Strikes Back Decision at Buna: New Guinea 
1942-1943 when he writes:
The area around Buna was 
dominated by the Girua River, 
which emptied into the bay 
through several channels. One of 
these, Entrance Creek, wound its 
way between the village and the 
government station. To the east 
was a huge swamp formed by 
the backup of the river over the 
low-lying ground. These natural 
obstacles alone would make it 
difficult for troops moving toward 
Buna from the interior.17
This written account observes that the 
terrain caused problems for the troops, 
but it does not explain how the terrain 
13 Wellington Francis Homminga, oral history, MMHI.
14 Blakeley, 25.
15 Stephen Janicki, oral history, MMHI.
16 Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, The War in the Pacific, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1957), 56.
17 Gailey, 37.
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affected the soldiers themselves. Milner 
also over generalizes why the terrain was 
a military nightmare. He writes, 
It rained steadily during the preceding 
few weeks, and the heavy tropical 
downpour continued….Except for 
a few abandoned plantations and 
mission stations, the corridor was a 
sodden welter of jungle and swamp, 
an utter nightmare for any force 
operating in it.18 
With details such as these, the 
reader is left questioning what sort 
of a nightmare was it for the actual 
common soldiers, and what were their 
experiences like in this nightmare? 
The written texts document that the 
terrain was so miserable that it could 
be explained as a military nightmare, 
but they do not examine how it directly 
affected the soldiers.
Through the use of the Red Arrow 
accounts the necessary details that are 
not seen in the written histories are used 
to help interpret how the hardships 
of the terrain affected the men while 
in battle. For example, according to 
the veterans, the rivers caused several 
problems. Hartmen explains that 
crossing the rivers in New Guinea could 
be easy, but was often quite difficult. 
He describes the river during flood 
season as being especially dangerous 
because it was easy to lose one’s balance 
with a full pack and rifle. Hartmen 
also describes the troubles of being 
in a watery terrain in regards to their 
foxholes. His description is that it would 
rain two times a day, and they were 
between the mountains and the ocean in 
a spot where the land was low and the 
jungle was thick. There they would dig 
their foxholes when the tide was out, 
and when it came back in their holes 
would fill up with six to seven inches of 
water.19 Homminga also tells about the 
trouble the soldiers incurred because of 
swampy conditions that they had to deal 
with, recalling that they were in swamps 
with water up to their knees for three to 
four days at a time and that they would 
sleep in them, eat in them, and relieve 
themselves in them because they had 
nowhere else to go. He also explains 
how at one point after spending days 
going through the swamps he stopped 
on dry land, and when he took his 
shoes off for the first time after being 
soaked through for days on end, his 
skin came off with them.20 The oral 
histories thus reveal more detailed 
information than the written histories 
do, going beyond simply stating that the 
rivers and swamps caused difficulties to 
showing how they did.
The second major discrepancy seen 
between the written and oral histories is 
an oversimplification on the hardships 
and negative effects of the jungle terrain 
and the soldiers’ continuing ability 
to fight. Written histories typically 
oversimplify the problems of hiking 
through the terrain. In MacArthur’s 
Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea 
Campaign Stephen Taaffe states:
New Guinea’s remote and hostile 
terrain challenged an American 
military establishment that 
emphasized firepower, technology, 
simplicity, mobility, and material 
superiority. In order to win the 
campaign, MacArthur had to 
overcome not only the Japanese 
but also the big island’s horrendous 
topography and climate.21 
This statement identifies general 
problems, but Taaffe does not explain 
these problems specifically. The oral 
histories again reveal what such 
problems meant to the soldiers and how 
they affected the course of the campaign. 
For example, when dealing with the 
issue of mobility, Red Arrow veteran 
Homminga explains that the jungle trails 
were extremely muddy and went up 
and down cliffs that were at seventy-five 
degree angles.22 Hartmen also describes 
the difficulties of these muddy cliffs. 
He states, “It was a nightmare. We 
would take three steps forward and we 
would slide two steps back.”23 Both 
men also describe the difficulties of 
sight in a dense jungle. Hartmen says 
that the troops could not see twenty to 
thirty feet in front of them and that this 
caused problems because they never 
knew who was shooting at them or 
whom they were shooting at. Veteran 
Stephen Janicki also goes into detail 
about how the lack of visibility because 
of the terrain affected their mobility. He 
describes the field of vision as being 
limited to two feet and that the jungle 
was overgrown. He said that the soldiers 
never knew which way the bullets were 
coming from, and they would holler 
out to each other, “It is coming from the 
right!” or “It is coming from the left!”24 
These oral history accounts provide 
richer descriptions of how the terrain 
affected the troops while in action. The 
written histories state that there were 
problems, but they do not explain how 
these problems arose, or how the men 
coped with them. Through the use of 
oral histories the reasoning and evidence 
for why the troop’s mobility was 
hindered becomes clear.
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18 Milner, 82.
19 Hartmen.
20 Homminga.
21 Stephen Taaffe, MacArthur’s Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 5.
22 Homminga.
23 Hartmen.
24 Janicki.
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While most written histories do not 
utilize oral history accounts, Gailey 
does effectively use a total of five oral 
histories in MacArthur Strikes Back. In 
an interview with First Sergeant Paul 
Lutjens describing how the effects of the 
terrain impeded the soldiers when they 
were hiking to Jaure, a location in New 
Guinea, Gailey writes:
It was one green hell to Jaure. We 
went up and down continuously; 
the company would be stretched 
over two to three miles. We’d start 
at six every morning by cooking 
rice or trying to. Two guys would 
work together. If they could start 
a fire, which was hard because the 
wood was wet even when you cut 
deep into the center of the log, 
they’d mix a little bully beef into 
a canteen cup with rice, to get the 
starchy taste out of it. Sometimes 
we’d take turns blowing on sparks 
trying to start a fire, and keep it up 
for two hours without success. I 
could hardly describe the country. 
It would take five or six hours to 
go a mile; edging along cliff walls, 
hanging on to vines, up and down, 
up and down. The men got weaker; 
guys began to lag back….An officer 
stayed at the end of the line to keep 
driving the stragglers. There wasn’t 
any way of evacuating to the rear. 
Men with sprained ankles hobbled 
along as well as they could, driven 
on by fear of being left behind.25
Gailey’s use of this oral history gives 
personal details about why the men had 
troubles with mobility. It shows how the 
watery conditions made it difficult on 
the men, not only physically, but with 
the tasks of cooking as well. This oral 
history gives the necessary narrative 
for the reader to understand why the 
terrain was difficult for the troops to 
maneuver. Gailey’s use of oral histories 
and interviews are exceptional, and 
they help provide richer context in 
regards to how events or obstacles such 
as the terrain affected the troops while 
in combat. While Gailey does not cite 
oral histories often in his account of 
the New Guinea Campaign, the small 
number of examples he does cite clearly 
demonstrate the value of oral histories. 
The oral histories offer evidence on why 
the terrain caused problems in mobility. 
They describe why the obstacles in the 
terrain such as steep cliffs, mud, water, 
swamps, and overgrown jungle slowed 
the men down, which affected their 
fighting conditions. The oral history 
excerpt that Gailey used provides 
evidence that these personal accounts 
add new perspectives and insight into 
why the terrain affected the troops and 
how it affected them. 
Through the use of first-hand oral 
history accounts a new perspective is 
also given in regards to the American and 
Australian soldiers’ relationships. The 
oral histories of the Red Arrow veterans 
provide a more accurate, clearer picture 
when examining the complex nature of 
the American and Australian soldiers’ 
interactions. Written histories like Gailey’s 
MacArthur Strikes Back tend to focus on 
the friction between the Australian and 
American soldiers. Gailey writes that 
the relation between off-duty American 
and Australian servicemen was vexing.26 
His book focuses on such incidents as 
one which occurred on November 26, 
1942 when U.S. Military Police and 
Australian soldiers clashed outside of 
Brisbane, Australia. The result was that 
one Australian solider was killed and 
nine were wounded. The following day, 
Australian troops randomly attacked 
American soldiers, which ended with 
twenty-one injured. This written text 
emphasizes, “The blending together of 
U.S. and Australian systems did not 
work well.”27 When Gailey examines the 
American and Australian officers’ and 
soldiers’ attitudes toward each other, he 
uses secondary sources to conclude that 
the antipathy felt by individual soldiers 
extended to the officers as well.28 In 
addition Gailey writes, “Contrary to 
the myths that developed in the years 
after the war, they [off-duty American 
and Australian servicemen] did not 
like one another.”29 On the other hand, 
oral histories expose a different primary 
perspective. They reveal that the 
relationships were positive, rather than 
the vexing relationships that the written 
texts portray. 
The Red Arrow veteran’s oral histories 
have provided a more accurate, clearer 
picture when examining the complex 
nature of the American and Australian 
soldiers’ relationships. The oral histories 
reveal that the common everyday 
soldiers did get along well with each 
other and were even helpful to one 
another. Hartmen’s oral history examines 
their interactions, and he concludes 
that the Auzzies were good people, 
they were terrific fighters, and they got 
along well with the soldiers, especially 
in New Guinea. He states, “They were 
darn good men.”30 He also goes into 
depth about how the Australians and 
Americans worked well together, unlike 
25 Gailey, 108-109.
26 Gailey, 155.
27 Gailey, 156.
28 Gailey, 156.
29 Gailey, 155.
30 Hartmen.
30
what the written texts document. 
Hartmen tells how the Australians gave 
the Americans advice on how to fight. 
They told them to keep their heads 
down and to follow their common 
sense. Red Arrow veteran Erwin 
Veneklase also goes into depth on the 
Australian soldiers. Veneklase describes 
how the Australians gave them helpful 
advice. At one point in New Guinea, an 
Australian soldier told him, “Don’t shoot 
the Japanese, let him go by and then 
you hit them in the back of the head 
with a gun…take your knife and cut 
their throat, that don’t make a sound.”31 
This may sound like gruesome advice, 
but it was something that could save 
the American soldiers’ lives. The oral 
histories show that the relation between 
the Americans and their Australian 
allies was amiable and helpful. Janicki 
says, “We went into Brisbane and the 
Australian officers came in and told us 
how the Japanese operated.”32 Janicki 
also explains how the Australian’s advice 
helped save their lives. He says that 
while they were training in Australia, the 
Australians had given them life saving 
advice about the necessity of watching 
both ahead of them and above them. 
After active combat in New Guinea 
he recalls, “They realized what the 
Australians had told them was true 
about the Japanese tying themselves 
in the trees.”33 Many of the Red Arrow 
veterans respected the Australians 
because they recognized the hardships 
they were going through without 
receiving much repayment. Veneklase 
states, “I would say I have the highest 
regards for the Australian people. I was 
making more in the service than the 
guys in Australia were making working 
seven days a week.”34 This also shows 
that the two systems, as Gailey refers 
to them, got along well, were helpful 
to one another, respected one another, 
and saved each other’s lives by sharing 
information. By utilizing oral histories, 
new perspectives and new insights 
have been added to what the written 
texts document. The written texts look 
at legitimate points during which the 
soldiers may not have gotten along, but 
they fail to recognize the whole story. 
They do not show that the two groups 
did get along the majority of the time. 
The oral histories do recognize that 
while the Australians and Americans had 
reasons not to get along together, they 
still did. These first-hand accounts show 
that they were friendly and even helpful 
to one another, which is something that 
the written texts fail to document.
The effects of various tropical diseases 
in the New Guinea Campaign are also 
characterized more accurately and in 
more detail in the oral histories than 
in the written histories, which tend 
to be vague and inaccurate. These 
discrepancies between the written 
and oral histories can be seen in the 
descriptions of the tropical diseases, 
dysentery, the physical effects of malaria, 
and in the number of cases of malaria. 
The pamphlet New Guinea, issued by 
the U.S. Army shortly after the war, is a 
prime example of how the written texts 
are too vague when describing tropical 
diseases in the New Guinea Campaign. 
It says:
Disease thrived on New Guinea. 
Malaria was the greatest debilitator, 
but dengue fever, dysentery, scrub, 
typhus, and a host of other tropical 
sickness awaited unwary soldiers 
in the jungle. Scattered tiny coastal 
settlements dotted the flat malarial 
north coastline, but inland the lush 
tropical jungle swallowed men and 
equipment.35
After this statement, which is lacking 
in detail, the text goes on to describe 
aspects of the terrain. It does not 
examine the details of the various 
diseases or the effects of the disease on 
the soldiers and their abilities to fight 
while in combat. 
Dysentery is also vaguely addressed 
in MacArthur Strikes Back. Gailey 
inadequately addresses the issue of 
the many tropical diseases. He writes, 
“Intestinal disorders and skin diseases 
were epidemic. Severe diarrheas 
and dysentery could not be treated 
adequately given the conditions along 
the trail…”36 Milner also explains the 
problem of dysentery with insufficient 
detail. Milner writes, “Dysentery was 
the most widespread affliction.”37 Gailey 
and Milner refer to the vastness of 
the various diseases, but neither one 
examines indepth the effects that these 
tropical diseases had on the men. 
The Red Arrow veterans’ oral histories 
provide the dramatic descriptions and 
necessary information on the effects 
of the various diseases on the soldiers’ 
ability to fight, and they provide the 
necessary context to understanding 
the written records. In Hartmen’s oral 
history, he says that there were flies all 
over the food, and the men were getting 
dysentery because of it. He explains that 
they were all passing blood, and the 
medics did not know what to do about 
it because it was not a couple of men, 
but the whole regiment of two to three 
thousand men.38 Janicki also describes 
the effects of dysentery on him. He says 
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31 Erwin Veneklase.
32 Janicki, oral history.
33 Janicki, oral history. 
34 Veneklase, oral history.
35 U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, “New Guinea,” 1.
36 Gailey, 51-52.
37 Milner, 197.
38 Hartmen.
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that he entered the war weighing one 
hundred and eighty pounds and he left 
the hospital weighing one hundred and 
twenty pounds because of dysentery.39 
Descriptive details such as these add 
new insight into what the effects of 
dysentery were on the men. Rather 
than plainly stating that it was a large 
problem, these oral histories show that 
the men who were suffering from these 
tropical diseases, especially dysentery, 
were impeded by the effects while 
fighting a war. They were physically 
exhausted, they were passing blood, 
and they were losing an extensive 
amount of weight, which crippled them 
while trying to march through a dense, 
mountainous jungle, fighting a war. 
Malaria is another example of a 
tropical disease that is not adequately 
described by the written histories in 
terms of its physical effects. Malaria is 
generally addressed, but not with the 
sufficient details of what it is, or how it 
affected the troops. On the other hand, 
the Red Arrow veterans’ oral histories 
provide these necessary details, which 
the written histories tend to gloss 
over. In MacArthur Strikes Back, Gailey 
states, “Malaria was a scourge, and the 
hard pressed officers, faced with an 
increasing number of battle casualties, 
could do little to aid those who had the 
debilitating disease.”40 This statement 
raises the questions: what are the 
symptoms of malaria and how did they 
affect the men? Author Samuel Milner 
also uses vague descriptions when 
describing malaria. He writes, “Some 
of the men picked up malaria in the 
mosquito-infested swamps along the 
Musa, and the weakening effects of the 
march were apparent in the subsequent 
operations of the battalion.”41 This 
written statement does not describe 
what the weakening effects were or what 
malaria did to the men who were trying 
to fight a war in the dense New Guinea 
jungle while being infected with this 
horrific tropical disease. 
The Red Arrow personal narratives 
thoroughly examine the physical effects 
of malaria, giving a different perspective 
on the “debilitating disease” and its 
“weakening effects.”
Red Arrow veteran Robert Hartmen 
goes into more detail about how malaria 
physically affected him while fighting in 
New Guinea. In his oral history he states:
[I] had a 103-degree/104 degree 
fever, and I went to the medics. 
There they gave me twenty-five 
grams of quinine, and they lay me 
down on the ground. They put a 
cover over me and twenty-four hours 
later my fever broke, and they sent 
me back to the front lines.42
This description gives a different 
perspective on how it directly affected 
the common soldier. It shows how 
severe their fevers were and what little 
medical help was available to aid them. 
Red Arrow veteran Homminga also 
describes malaria in a more detailed 
way that gives a new perspective on the 
disease. He states, 
Malaria is a disease that is 
transmitted by the mosquito and 
it enters your system in your liver 
and kidneys. You get an extremely 
high fever and you get the chills. 
You could shake a bed across the 
floor….It takes days to get over an 
episode, but you always have the 
bug in your system.43
Veteran Stephen Janicki also explains 
the symptoms of malaria. In his oral 
history he says, “you got a high fever, 
and you became soaking wet with 
sweat, and then you would suddenly be 
absolutely freezing.”44 He explains that 
you would go from hot to cold, and that 
you became delirious and eventually 
passed out.45 These descriptions also 
give a different look into the disease 
malaria than the written histories do. 
They describe how malaria infected the 
men, and they explain the symptoms of 
the disease. By utilizing oral histories, 
a detailed description of the disease 
is given rather than the simple vague 
statements in the written histories such 
as, “Malaria and exhaustion were taking 
a toll on the men inside and outside the 
block.”46 Oral histories give a more vivid 
description and definition of malaria 
than the written texts. By utilizing these 
oral histories, malaria can be understood 
in a more detailed manner, and through 
the use of oral histories, many aspects of 
malaria that are in the written histories 
and are wrong can be corrected.
The written histories also give 
inaccurate information in terms of the 
number of cases of malaria in the New 
Guinea Campaign. Had the authors 
utilized oral histories, these false 
descriptions would not have occurred. 
Stephen Taaffe writes in MacArthur’s 
Jungle War, 
Malaria initially caused SWPA 
[South Pacific Area] problems. In 
February 1943, for example, 23 
out of every 1000 SWPA personnel 
were in hospital with malaria at any 
given time, and the average stay the 
following month was twenty-eight 
days per afflicted patient.”47 
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40 Gailey, 52.
41 Milner, 107.
42 Hartmen.
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47 Taaffe, 117.
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He then adds: 
MacArthur appointed Colonel 
Howard Smith, a former public 
health officer who had been the 
Philippines’ chief of quarantine 
service, to bring malaria under 
control. Smith and other SWPA 
health officers introduced DDT, 
repellent cream, atabrine (a 
synthetic quinine), mosquito 
netting, and other suppressant 
and prevention measures to the 
theatre….Such stringent measures 
worked. In March 1944, only 2 per 
1000 SWPA personnel were in the 
hospital for malaria at any given 
time, and the average stay was nine 
days. In fact, as of 1 April 1944, 
there were only 751 malaria cases 
throughout the entire theatre.48
Taaffe researches the malaria problem by 
utilizing medical records from the U.S. 
Army forces in the Southwest Pacific 
Area. He does not utilize oral histories 
or examine first-person accounts. This 
leads to problems because the common 
soldiers, those who were infected with 
malaria, are not being consulted. Only 
second-hand written medical reports 
are used, and, in this case, they tend 
to be inaccurate, portraying malaria as 
an improving problem with fewer men 
contracting malaria after 1944 because 
of new medical improvements and 
preventions. By utilizing the soldiers’ 
oral histories, a different story is told.
The oral histories from Red Arrow 
veterans like Janicki, Homminga, and 
Hartmen demonstrate that malaria was 
a much larger problem than Taaffe’s 
sources indicated. Homminga explains, 
“It was a one hundred percent killer, 
everyone had malaria.”49 He also goes on 
to describe the severity of the problem, 
which also explains how inaccurate 
the numbers in written texts were. 
Homminga describes the conditions in 
regards to malaria: 
After being in combat for a little bit 
they had too many people getting 
malaria so they wouldn’t let you go 
to the medics, hospital, whatever 
unless you had a one hundred and 
five degree fever or passed out….
They were pretty picky about 
whether you had a one hundred 
and five degree fever or not.50
This evidence, revealed through an oral 
history, contradicts the written texts. By 
utilizing oral histories, the inaccuracies 
in the written texts can be corrected. 
While improvements may have been 
made by 1944, the problem was not 
solved. Many men had previously 
contracted malaria, and once it entered 
their systems, they always had it. Also, 
despite medical improvements, Taaffe 
fails to recognize the severe conditions 
the men had to be in, before they could 
leave the front lines to see a medic, 
which explains why the U.S. medical 
records showed such a small number of 
cases, which in turn made the malaria 
problem look like it had undergone vast 
improvements between 1943 and 1944. 
Had the medical records recognized that 
men on the front lines were suffering 
from malaria, or had Taaffe utilized oral 
histories, his analysis would not have 
been so far off. 
By only utilizing the medical records, 
Taaffe is not only getting inaccurate 
numbers, he is failing to get the full 
picture on why the men had to have 
one hundred and five degree fevers 
in order to be sent to the hospital. 
Oral histories reveal this perspective. 
Sergeant Hartmen explains, “We were 
getting to the point where we couldn’t 
afford to lose another man to malaria. 
We were outfitted by the Japanese as it 
was.”51 Red Arrow veteran Janicki also 
offers further insight into the number 
of malaria-infected soldiers. In his oral 
history, he explains that there were 
nearly fifty to one hundred men on 
the front lines at any given time, all of 
whom were suffering from malaria, yet 
they were still forced to fight unless their 
fevers reached one hundred and five 
degrees or they fainted.52 Through these 
oral histories a new perspective on the 
high number of soldiers infected with 
malaria is seen. The Red Arrow veterans’ 
oral histories divulge the truth about the 
campaign. They correct the written text, 
revealing that the number of infected 
men was not down, rather the troop’s 
fevers had to reach one hundred and 
five degrees or they had to faint in order 
to be sent to a medical facility. This 
is one aspect of the problem that the 
written texts have failed to recognize 
making those texts inaccurate. By only 
researching malaria through the medical 
records, Taaffe is failing to understand 
the full problem that the Red Arrow 
veterans’ oral histories divulge. 
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In conclusion, personal narratives 
clearly play an important part in 
understanding the history of the New 
Guinea Campaign. Oral histories 
provide personal accounts from the 
viewpoints of both the officers and 
common soldiers. This adds a new 
perspective to what the written histories 
have documented in terms of training, 
terrain, allies’ relationships, and tropical 
diseases. They question the accuracy 
of some written texts, and they clarify 
other areas of the campaigns that 
the written texts have only vaguely 
examined. By utilizing oral histories, 
the story of the everyday individual 
soldier is told, which gives a different 
perspective and new insights into the 
New Guinea Campaign that cannot be 
seen in the written records. They collect 
and preserve the recorded memories of 
our veterans, which is a valuable and 
irreplaceable resource. 
In the words of one soldier, 
Wellington Francis Homminga, “The 
entire story comes together when oral 
histories are a part of it.”53 He also offers 
valuable insight into the positive effects 
of using oral histories. He remarks, 
“When we are gone history is gone with 
us, unless it is recorded, so I am glad 
you did this.”54 The Red Arrow veterans’ 
oral histories are a valuable resource that 
offers a different view than the written 
texts. They preserve our past, and 
in doing so, they clarify, correct, and 
increase the necessary descriptions in 
the New Guinea Campaign.
53 Homminga.
54 Homminga.
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